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Abstract
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small
number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the
single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control tech-
niques assume that observed behavior is an approximately optimal
solution to an unknown decision problem. These techniques learn a
utility function that explains the example behavior and can then be
used to accurately predict or imitate future behavior in similar ob-
served or unobserved situations.
In this work, we consider similar tasks in competitive and cooper-
ative multi-agent domains. Here, unlike single-agent settings, a player
cannot myopically maximize its reward; it must speculate on how the
other agents may act to influence the game’s outcome. Employing the
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game-theoretic notion of regret and the principle of maximum entropy,
we introduce a technique for predicting and generalizing behavior.
1 Introduction
Predicting the actions of others in complex and strategic settings is an im-
portant facet of intelligence that guides our interactions—from walking in
crowds to negotiating multi-party deals. Recovering such behavior from
merely a few observations is an important and challenging machine learning
task.
While mature computational frameworks for decision-making have been
developed to prescribe the behavior that an agent should perform, such
frameworks are often ill-suited for predicting the behavior that an agent
will perform. Foremost, the standard assumption of decision-making frame-
works that a criteria for preferring actions (e.g., costs, motivations and goals)
is known a priori often does not hold. Moreover, real behavior is typically
not consistently optimal or completely rational; it may be influenced by fac-
tors that are difficult to model or subject to various types of error when
executed. Meanwhile, the standard tools of statistical machine learning
(e.g., classification and regression) may be equally poorly matched to mod-
eling purposeful behavior; an agent’s goals often succinctly, but implicitly,
encode a strategy that would require a tremendous number of observations
to learn.
A natural approach to mitigate the complexity of recovering a full strat-
egy for an agent is to consider identifying a compactly expressed utility func-
tion that rationalizes observed behavior: that is, identify rewards for which
the demonstrated behavior is optimal and then leverage these rewards for
future prediction. Unfortunately, the problem is fundamentally ill-posed: in
general, many reward functions can make behavior seem rational, and in
fact, the trivial, everywhere zero reward function makes all behavior appear
rational [Ng and Russell, 2000]. Further, after removing such trivial reward
functions, there may be no reward function for which the demonstrated be-
havior is optimal as agents may be imperfect or the world they operate in
may only be approximately represented.
In the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control
methods have been used to bridge this gap between the prescriptive frame-
works and predictive applications [Abbeel and Ng, 2004, Ratliff et al., 2006,
Ziebart et al., 2008a, 2010]. Successful applications include learning and pre-
diction tasks in personalized vehicle route planning [Ziebart et al., 2008a],
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predictive cursor control [Ziebart et al., 2012], robotic crowd navigation [Henry
et al., 2010], quadruped foot placement and grasp selection [Ratliff et al.,
2009]. A reward function is learned by these techniques that both explains
demonstrated behavior and approximates the optimality criteria of decision-
theoretic frameworks.
As these methods only capture a single reward function and do not
reason about competitive or cooperative motives, inverse optimal control
proves inadequate for modeling the strategic interactions of multiple agents.
In this article, we consider the game-theoretic concept of regret as a stand-
in for the optimality criteria of the single-agent work. As with the inverse
optimal control problem, the result is fundamentally ill-posed. We address
this by requiring that for any utility function linear in known features, our
learned model must have no more regret than that of the observed behavior.
We demonstrate that this requirement can be re-cast as a set of equivalent
convex constraints that we denote the inverse correlated equilibrium (ICE)
polytope.
As we are interested in the effective prediction of behavior, we will use a
maximum entropy criteria to select behavior from this polytope. We demon-
strate that optimizing this criteria leads to mini-max optimal prediction of
behavior subject to approximate rationality. We consider the dual of this
problem and note that it generalizes the traditional log-linear maximum en-
tropy family of problems [Della Pietra et al., 2002]. We provide a simple
and computationally efficient gradient-based optimization strategy for this
family and show that only a small number of observations are required for
accurate prediction and transfer of behavior. We conclude by considering
a variety of experimental results, ranging from predicting travel routes in a
synthetic routing game to a market-entry econometric data-analysis explor-
ing regulatory effects on hotel chains in Texas.
Before we formalize imitation learning in matrix games, motivate our
assumptions and describe and analyze our approach, we review related work.
2 Related Work
Many research communities are interested in computational modeling of hu-
man behavior and, in particular, in modeling rational and strategic behavior
with incomplete knowledge of utility. Here we contrast the contributions of
three communities by overviewing their interests and approaches. We con-
clude by describing our contribution in the same light.
The econometrics community combines microeconomics and statistics
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to investigate the empirical properties of markets from sales records, census
data and other publicly available statistics. McFadden first considered es-
timating consumer preferences for transportation by assuming them to be
rational utility maximizers [McFadden, 1974]. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
estimate both supply and demand-side preferences in settings where the
firms must price their goods strategically [Berry et al., 1995]. Their initial
work described a procedure for measuring the desirability of certain auto-
mobile criteria, such as fuel economy and features like air conditioning, to
determine substitution effects.
The Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes approach and its derivatives can be
crudely described as model-fitting techniques. First, a parameterized class
of utility functions are assumed for both the producers and consumers. Vari-
ables that are unobservable to the econometrician, such as internal produc-
tion costs and certain aspects of the consumer’s preferences, are known
as shocks and are modeled as independent random variables. The draws
of these random variables are known to the market’s participants, but only
their distributions are known to the econometrician. Second, an equilibrium
pricing model is assumed for the producers. The consumers are typically
assumed to be utility maximizers having no strategic interactions with in
the market. Finally, an estimation technique is optimistically employed to
determine a set of parameter values that are consistent with the observed
behavior. Ultimately, it is from these parameter values that one derives
insight into the unobservable characteristics of the market. Unfortunately,
neither efficient sample nor computational complexity bounds are generally
available using this family of approaches.
A variety of questions have been investigated by econometricians using
this line of reasoning. Petrin investigated the competitive advantage of being
the first producer in a market by considering the introduction of the minivan
to the North American automotive industry [Petrin, 2002]. Nevo provided
evidence against price-fixing in the breakfast cereal market by measuring the
effects of advertising [Nevo, 2001]. Others have examined the mid-scale hotel
market to determine the effects of different regulatory practices [Suzuki,
2010] and how overcapacity can be used to deter competition [Conlin and
Kadiyali, 2006]. As a general theme, the econometricians are interested
in the intentions that guide behavior. That is, the observed behavior is
considered to be the truth and the decision-making framework used by the
producers and consumers is known a priori.
The decision theory community is interested in human behavior on a
more individual level. They, too, note that out-of-the-box game theory
fails to explain how people act in many scenarios. As opposed to viewing
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this as a flaw in the theories, they focus on both how to alter the games
that model our interactions in addition to devising human-like decision-
making algorithms. The former can be achieved through modifications to the
players’ utility functions, which are known a priori, to incorporate notions
such as risk aversion and spite [Myers and Sadler, 1960, Erev et al., 2008].
latter approaches often tweak learning algorithms by integrating memory
limitations or emphasizing recent or surprising observations [Camerer and
Ho, 1999, Erev and Barron, 2005].
the Iterative Weighting and Sampling algorithm (I-SAW) is more likely
to choose the action with the highest estimated utility, but recent observa-
tions are weighted more highly and, in the absence of a surprising obser-
vation, the algorithm favors repeating previous actions [Erev et al., 2010].
Memory limitations, or more generally bounded rationality, have also led to
novel equilibrium concepts such as the quantal response equilibrium [McK-
elvey and Palfrey, 1995]. This concept assumes the players’ strategies have
faults, but that small errors, in terms of forgone utility, are much more com-
mon than large errors. Contrasting with the econometricians, the decision
theory community is mainly interested in the algorithmic process of human
decision-making. The players’ preferences are known and observed behavior
serves only to validate or inform an experimental hypothesis.
Finally, the machine learning community is interested in predicting and
imitating the behavior of humans and expert systems. Much work in this
area focuses on the single-agent setting and in such cases it is known as
inverse optimal control or inverse reinforcement learning [Abbeel and Ng,
2004, Ng and Russell, 2000]. Here, the observed behavior is assumed to be
an approximately optimal solution to an unknown decision problem. At a
high level, known solutions typically summarize the behavior as parame-
ters to a low dimensional utility function. A number of methods have been
introduced to learn these weights, including margin-based methods [Ratliff
et al., 2006] that can utilize black box optimal control or planning soft-
ware, as well as maximum entropy-based methods with desirable predictive
guarantees [Ziebart et al., 2008a]. These utility weights are then used to
mimic the behavior in similar situations through a decision-making algo-
rithm. Unlike the other two communities, it is the predictive performance
of the learned model that is most pivotal and noisy observations are expected
and managed by those techniques.
This article extends our prior publication—a novel maximum entropy
approach for predicting behavior in strategic multi-agent domains [Waugh
et al., 2011a,b]. We focus on the computationally and statistically efficient
recovery of good estimates of behavior (the only observable quantity) by
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leveraging rationality assumptions. The work presented here further devel-
ops those ideas in two key ways. First, we consider distributions over games
and parameterized families of deviations using the notion of conditional en-
tropy. Second, this work enables more fine-grained assumptions regarding
the players’ possible preferences. Finally, this work presents the analysis
of data-sets from both the econometric and decision theory communities,
comparing and contrasting the methods presented with statistical methods
that are blind to the strategic aspects of the domains.
Before describing our approach, we will introduce the necessary notation
and background.
3 Preliminaries
Notation
Let V be a Hilbert space with an inner product 〈·, ·〉 : V × V → R. For
any set K ⊆ V , let K∗ = {x | 〈x, y〉 ≥ 0,∀y ∈ K} be its dual cone. We
let ‖v‖2 =
√〈v, v〉, and, if V is of finite dimension with orthonormal basis
{e1, . . . , eK}, let ‖v‖1 =
∑K
k=1 |αk| where v =
∑K
k=1 αkek. Typically, we will
take V = RK and use the standard inner product.
Game Theory
Matrix games are the canonical tool of game theorists for representing
strategic interactions ranging from illustrative toy problems, such as the
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” and the “Battle of the Sexes” games, to important
negotiations, collaborations, and auctions. Unlike the traditional defini-
tion [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994], in this work we model games where
only the features of the players’ utility are known and not the utilities them-
selves.
Definition 1. A vector-valued normal-form game is a tuple Γ = (N ,A, uΓi )
where
• N is the finite set of the game’s N players,
• A = ×i∈NAi is the set of the game’s outcomes or joint-actions,
where
• Ai is the finite set of actions or strategies for player i, and
• uΓi : A → V is the utility feature function for player i.
6
We let A = maxi∈N |Ai|.
Players aim to maximize their utility, a quantity measuring happiness
or individual well-being. We assume that the players’ utility is a common
linear function of the utility features. This will allow us to treat the players
anonymously should we so desire. One can expand the utility feature space
if separate utility functions are desired. We write the utility for player i at
outcome a under utility function w ∈ V as
uΓi (a|w) = 〈uΓi (a), w〉.
In contrast to the standard definition of normal-form games, where the
utility functions for game outcomes are known, in this work we assume that
the true utility function, formed by w∗, which governs observed behavior,
is unknown. This allows us to model real-world scenarios where a cardinal
utility is not available or is subject to personal taste. Consider, for instance,
a scenario where multiple drivers each choose a route among shared roads.
Each outcome, which specifies a travel plan for all drivers, has a variety of
easily measurable quantities that may impact the utility of a driver, such as
travel time, distance, average speed, number of intersections and so on, but
how these quantities map to utility depends on the internal preferences of
the drivers.
We model the players using a joint strategy, σΓ ∈ ∆A, which is a dis-
tribution over the game’s outcomes. Coordination between players can exist,
thus, this distribution need not factor into independent strategies for each
player. Conceptually, a trusted signaling mechanism, such as a traffic light,
can be thought to sample an outcome from σΓ and communicate to each
player ai, its portion of the joint-action. Even in situations where players
are incapable of communication prior to play, correlated play is attainable
through repetition. In particular, there are simple learning dynamics that,
when employed by each player independently, converge to a correlated solu-
tion [Foster and Vohra, 1996, Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000].
If a player can benefit through a unilateral deviation from the proposed
joint strategy, the strategy is unstable. As we are considering coordinated
strategies, a player may condition its deviations on the recommended action.
That is, a deviation for player i is a function fi : Ai → Ai [Blum and
Mansour, 2007]. To ease the notation, we overload fi : A → A to be the
function that modifies only player i’s action according to fi.
Two well-studied classes of deviations are the switch deviation,
switchx→yi (ai) =
{
y if ai = x
ai otherwise,
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which substitutes one action for another, and the fixed deviation,
fixed→yi (ai) = y,
which does not condition its change on the prescribed action. A deviation
set, denoted Φ, is a set of deviation functions. We call the set of all switch
deviations the internal deviation set, Φint, and the set of all fixed deviations
the external deviation set, Φext. The set Φswap is the set of all determinis-
tic deviations. Given that the other players indeed play their recommended
actions, there is no strategic advantage to considering randomized devia-
tions.
The benefit of applying deviation fi when the players jointly play a
is known as instantaneous regret. We write the instantaneous regret
features as
rΓfi(a) = u
Γ
i (fi(a))− uΓi (a),
and the instantaneous regret under utility function w as
rΓfi(a|w) = uΓi (fi(a)|w)− uΓi (a|w) = 〈rΓfi(a), w〉.
More generally, we can consider broader classes of deviations than the
two we have mentioned. Conceptually, a deviation is a strategy modification
and its regret is its benefit to a particular player. As we will ultimately only
work with the regret features, we can now suppress the implementation
details while bearing in mind that a deviation typically has these prescribed
semantics. That is, a deviation f ∈ Φ has associated instantaneous regret
features, rΓf (·), and instantaneous regret, rΓf (·|w).
As a player is only privileged to its own portion of the coordinated out-
come, it must reason about its expected regret. We write the expected
regret features as
rΓf (σ
Γ) = Ea∼σΓ
[
rΓf (a)
]
,
and the expected regret under utility function w as
rΓf (σ
Γ|w) = Ea∼σΓ
[
rΓf (a|w)
]
= 〈rΓf (σΓ), w〉.
A joint strategy is in equilibrium or, in a sense, stable if no player can
benefit through a unilateral deviation. We can quantify this stability using
expected regret with respect to the deviation set Φ,
RegretΓΦ(σ
Γ|w) = max
f∈Φ
rΓf (σ
Γ|w),
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and call a joint strategy σΓ an ε-equilibrium if
RegretΓΦ(σ
Γ|w) ≤ ε.
The most general deviation set, Φswap, corresponds with the ε-correlated
equilibrium solution concept [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Blum and
Mansour, 2007]. Thus, regret can be thought of as the natural substitute
for utility when assessing the optimality of behavior in multi-agent settings.
The set Φswap is typically intractably large. Fortunately, internal re-
gret closely approximates swap regret and is polynomially-sized in both the
number of actions and players.
Lemma 1. If joint strategy σΓ has ε internal regret, then it is an Aε-
correlated equilibrium under utility function w. That is, ∀w ∈ V ,
RegretΓ
Φint
(σΓ|w) ≤ RegretΓ
Φswap(σ
Γ|w) ≤ A · RegretΓ
Φint
(σΓ|w).
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
4 Behavior Estimation in a Matrix Game
We are now equipped with the tools necessary to introduce our approach for
imitation learning in multi-agent settings. We start by assuming a notion of
rationality on the part of the game’s players. By leveraging this assumption,
we will then derive an estimation procedure with much better statistical
properties than methods that are unaware of the game’s structure.
4.1 Rationality and the ICE Polytope
Let {at}Tt=1 be a sequence of T independent observations of behavior in game
Γ distributed according to σΓ, the players’ true behavior. We call the em-
pirical distribution of the observations, σ˜Γ, the demonstrated behavior.
We aim to learn a distribution σˆΓ, called the predicted behavior, an
estimation of the true behavior from these demonstrations. Moreover, we
would like our learning procedure to extract the motives for the behavior
so that we may imitate the players in similarly structured, but unobserved
games. Initially, let us consider just the estimation problem. While deriving
our method, we will assume we have access to the players’ true behavior.
Afterwards, we will analyze the error introduced by approximating from the
demonstrations.
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Imitation appears hard barring further assumptions. In particular, if the
agents are unmotivated or their intentions are not coerced by the observed
game, there is little hope of recovering principled behavior in a new game.
Thus, we require a form of rationality.
Proposition 1. The players in a game are rational with respect to devia-
tion set Φ if they prefer joint-strategy σΓ over joint strategies σ´Γ when
RegretΓΦ(σ
Γ|w∗) < RegretΓΦ(σ´Γ|w∗).
Our rationality assumption states that the players are driven to minimize
their regret. It is not necessarily the case that they indeed have low or no
regret, but simply that they can evaluate their preferences and that they
prefer joint strategies with low regret. Through this assumption, we will be
able to reason about the players’ behavior solely through the game’s features;
this is what leads to the improved statistical properties of our approach.
As agents’ true preferences w∗ are unknown, we consider an encompass-
ing assumption that requires that estimated behavior satisfy this property
for all possible utility weights. A prediction σˆΓ is strongly rational with
respect to deviation set Φ if
∀w ∈ V, RegretΓΦ(σˆΓ|w) ≤ RegretΓΦ(σΓ|w).
This assumption is similar in spirit to the utility matching assumption
employed by inverse optimal control techniques in single-agent settings. As
in those settings, we have an if and only if guarantee relating rationality
and strong rationality [Abbeel and Ng, 2004, Ziebart et al., 2008a].
Theorem 1. If a prediction σˆΓ is strongly rational with respect to deviation
set Φ and the players are rational with respect to Φ, then they do not prefer
σΓ over σˆΓ.
This is immediate as w∗ ∈ V .
Phrased another way, a strongly rational prediction is no worse than the
true behavior.
Corollary 1. If a prediction σˆΓ is strongly rational with respect to deviation
set Φ and the true behavior is an ε-equilibrium with respect to Φ under utility
function w∗ ∈ V , then σˆΓ is also an ε-equilibrium.
Again, the proof is immediate as RegretΓΦ(σˆ
Γ|w∗) ≤ RegretΓΦ(σΓ|w∗) ≤ ε.
Conversely, if we are uncertain about the true utility function we must
assume strong rationality or we risk predicting less desirable behavior.
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Theorem 2. If a prediction σˆΓ is not strongly rational with respect to de-
viation set Φ and the players are rational, then there exists a w∗ ∈ V such
that σΓ is preferred to σˆΓ.
The proof follows from the negation of the definition of strong rationality.
By restricting our attention to strongly rational behavior, at worst agents
acting according to their unknown true preferences will be indifferent be-
tween our predictive distribution and their true behavior. That is, strong
rationality is necessary and sufficient under the assumption players are ra-
tional given no knowledge of their true utility function.
Unfortunately, a direct translation of the strong rationality requirement
into constraints on the distribution σˆΓ leads to a non-convex optimization
problem as it involves products of varying utility vectors with the behavior
to be estimated. Fortunately, we can provide an equivalent concise convex
description of the constraints on σˆΓ that ensures any feasible distribution
satisfies strong rationality. We denote this set of equivalent constraints as
the Inverse Correlated Equilibria (ICE) polytope.
Definition 2 (Standard ICE Polytope).
rΓf (σˆ
Γ) = Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ)
]
, ∀f ∈ Φ
ηf ∈ ∆Φf , ∀f ∈ Φ
σˆΓ ∈ ∆A.
Here, we have introduced Φf , the set of deviations that f will be com-
pared against. Our rationality assumption corresponds to when Φf = Φ, but
there are different choices that have reasonable interpretations as alternative
rationality assumptions. For example, if each switch deviation is compared
only against switches for the same player—a more restrictive condition—
then the quality of the equilibrium is measured by the sum of all players’
regrets, as opposed to only the one with the most regret.
The following corollary equates strong rationality and the standard ICE
polytope.
Corollary 2. A prediction σˆΓ is strongly rational with respect to deviation
set Φ if and only if for all f ∈ Φ there exists ηf ∈ ∆Φ such that σˆΓ and η
satisfy the standard ICE polytope.
We now show a more general result that implies Corollary 2. We start
by generalizing the notion of strong rationality by restricting w∗ to be in
11
a known set K ⊆ V . We say a prediction σˆΓ is K-strongly rational with
respect to deviation set Φ if
∀w ∈ K, RegretΓΦ(σˆΓ|w) ≤ RegretΓΦ(σΓ|w).
If K is convex with non-empty relative interior and 0 ∈ K, we derive the
K-ICE polytope.
Definition 3 (K-ICE Polytope).
rΓf (σˆ
Γ)− Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ)
] ∈ −K∗, ∀f ∈ Φ
ηf ∈ ∆Φf , ∀f ∈ Φ
σˆΓ ∈ ∆A.
Note that the above constraints are linear in σˆΓ and ηf , and K∗, the
dual cone, is convex. The following theorem shows the equivalence of the
K-ICE polytope and K-strong rationality.
Theorem 3. A prediction σˆΓ is K-strongly rational with respect to deviation
set Φ if and only if for all f ∈ Φ there exists ηf ∈ ∆Φ such that σˆΓ and η
satisfy the K-ICE polytope.
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
By choosing K = V , then K∗ = {0} and the polytope reduces to the
standard ICE polytope. Thus, Corollary 2 follows directly from Theorem 3.
By choosing K to be the positive orthant, K = K∗ = RK+ , the polytope
reduces to the following inequalities. Here, we explicitly assume the utility
to be a positive linear function of the features.
Definition 4 (Positive ICE Polytope).
rΓf (σˆ
Γ) ≤ Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ)
]
, ∀f ∈ Φ
ηf ∈ ∆Φf , ∀f ∈ Φ
σˆΓ ∈ ∆A.
Predictive behavior within the ICE polytope will retain the quality of the
demonstrations provided. The following corollaries formalize this guarantee.
Corollary 3. If the true behavior is an ε-correlated equilibrium under w∗ in
game Γ, then a prediction σˆΓ that satisfies the standard ICE polytope where
Φ = Φswap and ∀f ∈ Φ,Φf = Φ is also an ε-correlated equilibrium.
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This follows immediately from the definition of an approximate corre-
lated equilibrium.
Corollary 4. If the true behavior is an ε-correlated equilibrium under w∗ in
game Γ, then a prediction σˆΓ that satisfies the standard ICE polytope where
Φ = Φint and ∀f ∈ Φ,Φf = Φ is also an Aε-correlated equilibrium.
This follows immediately from Lemma 1.
In two-player constant-sum games, we can make stronger statements
about our predictive behavior. In particular, when these requirements are
satisfied we may reason about games without coordination. That is, each
player chooses their action independently using their strategy, σΓi a dis-
tribution over Ai. A strategy profile σ
Γ consists of a strategy for each
player. It defines a joint-strategy with no coordination between the players.
A game is constant-sum if there is a fixed amount of utility divided
among the players. That is, if there is a constant C such that ∀a ∈ A,∑
i∈N
uΓi (a|w∗) = C.
In settings where the players act independently, we use external regret
to measure a profile’s stability, which corresponds with the famous Nash
equilibrium solution concept [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994]. By using
the ICE polytope with external regret, we can recover a Nash equilibrium if
one is demonstrated in a constant-sum game.
Theorem 4. If the true behavior is an ε-Nash equilibrium in a two-player
constant-sum game Γ, then the marginal strategies formed from a predic-
tion σˆΓ that satisfies the standard ICE polytope where Φ = Φext and ∀f ∈
Φ,Φf = Φ is a 2ε-Nash equilibrium.
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
In general, there can be infinitely many correlated equilibrium with
vastly different properties. One such property that has received much atten-
tion is the social welfare of a joint strategy, which refers to the total utility
over all players. Our strong rationality assumption states that the players
have no preference on which correlated equilibrium is selected, and thus
without modification cannot capture such a concept should it be demon-
strated. We can easily maintain the social welfare of the demonstrations
by additionally preserving the players’ utilities along side the constraints
prescribed by the ICE polytope. A joint strategy is utility-preserving under
all utility functions if
∀w ∈ V, i ∈ N , uΓi (σˆΓ|w) = uΓi (σΓ|w).
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As with the correspondence between strong rationality and the ICE poly-
tope, utility preservation can be represented as a set of linear equality con-
straints. These utility feature matching constraints are exactly the basis
of many methods of inverse optimal control [Abbeel and Ng, 2004, Ziebart
et al., 2008a].
Theorem 5. A joint strategy is utility-preserving under all utility functions
if and only if
i ∈ N , uΓi (σˆΓ) = uΓi (σΓ).
The proof is due to Abbeel and Ng [2004].
A notable choice for Φf is we compare each deviation only to itself. As
a consequence this enforces a stronger constraint that the regret under each
deviation, and in turn the overall regret, is the same under our prediction
and the demonstrations. That is, σˆΓ is regret-matching as for all w ∈ V ,
RegretΓΦ(σˆ
Γ|w) = RegretΓΦ(σΓ|w).
Thus, regret-matching preserves the equilibrium qualities of the demonstra-
tions.
Unlike the correspondence between the ICE polytope and strong ratio-
nality, matching the regret features for each deviation is not required for a
strategy to match the regrets of the demonstrations. That is, the converse
does not hold.1
Theorem 6. A prediction σˆΓ matches the regret of σΓ for all w ∈ V does
not necessarily match the regret features of σΓ.
We use both utility and regret matching in our final set of experiments.
The former for predictive reasons, the latter to allow for the use of smooth
minimization techniques.
4.2 The Principle of Maximum Entropy
As we are interested in the problem of statistical prediction of strategic
behavior, we must find a mechanism to resolve the ambiguity remaining after
accounting for the rationality constraints. The principle of maximum
1We may sketch a simple counterexample. Consider a game with one player and three
actions, x, y and y′, where the utility for playing x is zero, and the utility for playing
either y or y′ is one. If the true behavior always plays y, then matching the regret features
will force the prediction to also play y. Predicting y′ also matches the regret, though.
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entropy, due to Jaynes [1957], provides a well-justified method for choosing
such a distribution. This choice leads to not only statistical guarantees on
the resulting predictions, but to efficient optimization.
The Shannon entropy of a joint-strategy σΓ is
HΓ(σΓ) = Ea∼σΓ
[− log σΓ(a)] ,
and the principle of maximum entropy advocates choosing the distribution
with maximum entropy subject to known constraints [Jaynes, 1957]. That
is,
σMaxEnt = argmax
σΓ∈∆A
HΓ(σΓ), subject to:
g(σΓ) = 0 and h(σΓ) ≤ 0.
The constraint functions, g and h, are typically chosen to capture the impor-
tant or most salient characteristics of the distribution. When those functions
are affine and convex respectively, finding this distribution is a convex op-
timization problem. The resulting log-linear family of distributions (e.g.,
logistic regression, Markov random fields, conditional random fields) are
widely used within statistical machine learning.
In the context of multi-agent behavior, the principle of maximum entropy
has been employed to obtain correlated equilibria with predictive guarantees
in normal-form games when the utilities are known a priori [Ortiz et al.,
2007]. We will now leverage its power with our rationality assumption to
select predictive distributions in games where the utilities are unknown, but
the important features that define them are available.
For our problem, the constraints are precisely that the distribution is
in the ICE polytope, ensuring that whatever we predict has no more regret
than the demonstrated behavior.
Definition 5. The primal maximum entropy ICE optimization problem is
maximize
σˆΓ,η
HΓ(σˆΓ) subject to:
rΓf (σˆ
Γ)− Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ)
] ∈ −K∗, ∀f ∈ Φ
ηf ∈ ∆Φf , ∀f ∈ Φ
σˆΓ ∈ ∆A.
This program is convex, feasible, and bounded. That is, it has a solution
and is efficiently solvable using simple techniques in this form.
Importantly, the maximum entropy prediction enjoys the following guar-
antee:
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Lemma 2. The maximum entropy ICE distribution minimizes over all
strongly rational distributions the worst-case log-loss, Ea∼σΓ
[− log2 σˆΓ(a)],
when σΓ is chosen adversarially but subject to strong rationality.
The proof of Lemma 2 follows immediately from the result of Gru¨nwald
and Dawid [2003].
4.3 Dual Optimization
In this section, we will derive and describe a procedure for optimizing the
dual program for solving the MaxEnt ICE optimization problem. We will see
that the dual multipliers can be interpreted as utility vectors and that opti-
mization in the dual has computational advantages. We begin by presenting
the dual program.
Theorem 7. The dual maximum entropy ICE optimization problem is the
following non-smooth, but convex program:
minimize
θf∈K∗∗
∑
f∈Φ
RegretΓΦf (σ
Γ|θf ) + logZΓ(θ), where
ZΓ(θ) =
∑
a∈A
exp
−∑
f∈Φ
rΓf (a|θf )
 .
We derive the dual in the Appendix.
As the dual’s feasible set has non-empty relative interior, strong duality
holds by Slater’s condition—there is no duality gap. We can also use a dual
solution to recover σˆΓ.
Lemma 3. Strong duality holds for the maximum entropy ICE optimization
problem and given optimal dual weights θ∗, the maximum entropy ICE joint-
strategy σˆΓ is
σˆΓ(a) ∝ exp
−∑
f∈Φ
rΓf (a|θ∗f )
 . (1)
The dual formulation of our program has important inherent computa-
tional advantages. First, so long as K is simple, the optimization is partic-
ularly well-suited for gradient-based optimization, a trait not shared by the
primal program. Second, the number of dual variables, |Φ|dimV , is typi-
cally much fewer than the number of primal variables, |A| + |Φ|2. Though
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Algorithm 1 Dual MaxEnt ICE Gradient
Input: Let σˆΓ be the prediction given the current dual weights, θ, as
from Equation (1).
for f ∈ Φ do
f∗ ← argmaxf ′∈Φf rΓf ′(σΓ|θf )
gf ← rΓf∗(σΓ)− rΓf (σˆΓ)
end for
return g
the work per iteration is still a function of |A| (to compute the partition
function), these two advantages together let us scale to larger problems
than if we consider optimizing the primal objective. Computing the expec-
tations necessary to descend the dual gradient can leverage recent advances
in the structured, compact game representations: in particular, any graphi-
cal game with low-treewidth or finite horizon Markov game [Kakade et al.,
2003] enables these computations to be performed in time that scales only
polynomially in the number of decision makers.
Algorithm 1 describes the dual gradient computation. This can be in-
corporated with any non-smooth gradient method, such as the projected
subgradient method [Shor, 1985], to approach the optimum dual weights.
5 Behavior Estimation in Parameterized Matrix
Games
To account for stochastic, or varying environments, we now consider distri-
butions over games. For example, rain may affect travel time along some
routes and make certain modes of transportation less desirable, or even
unavailable. Operationally, nature samples a game prior to play from a dis-
tribution known to the players. The players then as a group determine a
joint strategy conditioned on the particular game and an outcome is drawn
by a coordination device. We let G denote our class of games.
As before, we observe a sequence of T independent observations of play,
but now in addition to an outcome we also observe nature’s choice at each
time t. Let {(Γt, at)}Tt=1 be the aforementioned sequence of observations
drawn from ξ and σ, the true behavior. The empirical distribution of the
observations, ξ˜ and σ˜, together are the demonstrated behavior.
Now we aim to learn a predictive behavior distribution, σˆΓ, for any
Γ ∈ G, even ones we have not yet observed. Clearly, we must leverage the
17
observations across the entire family to achieve good predictive accuracy. We
continue to assume that the players’ utility is an unknown linear function,
w∗, of the games’ features and that this function is fixed across G. Next, we
amend our notion of regret and our rationality assumption.
5.1 Behavior Estimation through Conditional ICE
Ultimately, we wish to simply employ an additional expectation over the
game distribution when reasoning about the regret and regret features. To
do this, our notion of a deviation needs to account for the fact that it may
be executed in games with different structures. Operationally, one way to
achieve this is by having a deviation not act when it is applied to such a
game, which increases the size of Φ by a factor of |G|. If the actions, and
in turn the deviations, have similar semantic meanings across our entire
family of games, one can simply share the deviations across all games. This
allows for one to achieve transfer over an infinitely large class. Given such
a decision, we write the expected regret features under deviation f as
rξf (σ) = EΓ∼ξ
[
rΓf (σ
Γ)
]
,
and the expected regret under utility function w as
rξf (σ|w) = EΓ∼ξ
[
rΓf (σ
Γ|w)] .
Again, we quantify the stability of a set of joint strategies using this new
notion of expected regret with respect to the deviation set Φ,
RegretξΦ(σ|w) = maxf∈Φ r
ξ
f (σ|w),
which, in turn, entails a notion of an ε-equilibrium for a set of joint strategies,
a modified rationality assumption, and a slight modification to the K-ICE
polytope,
Definition 6 (Conditional K-ICE Polytope).
rξf (σˆ)− Eg∼ηf
[
rξg(σ)
]
∈ −K∗, ∀f ∈ Φ
ηf ∈ ∆Φf , ∀f ∈ Φ
σˆΓ ∈ ∆A. ∀Γ ∈ G
All that remains is to adjust our notion of entropy to take into account a
distribution over games. In particular, we choose to maximize the expected
entropy of our prediction, which is conditioned on the game sampled by
chance.
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Definition 7. The conditional Shannon entropy of a set of strategies σ when
games are distributed according to ξ is
Hξ(σ) = EΓ∼ξ
[
HΓ(σΓ)
]
.
The modified dual optimization problem has a familiar form. We now
use the new notion of regret and take the expected value of the log partition
function.
Theorem 8. The dual conditional maximum entropy ICE optimization
problem is
minimize
θf∈K∗∗
∑
f∈Φ
RegretξΦf (σ|θf ) + EΓ∼ξ
[
logZΓ(θ)
]
.
To recover the predicted behavior for a particular game, we use the same
exponential family form as before.
As with any machine learning technique, it is advisable to employ some
form of complexity control on the resulting predictor to prevent over-fitting.
As we now wish to generalize to unobserved games, we too should take
the appropriate precautions. In our experiments, we employ L1 and L2
regularization terms to the dual objective for this purpose. Regularization
of the dual weights effectively alters the primal constraints by allowing them
to hold approximately, leading to higher entropy solutions [Dud´ık et al.,
2007].
5.2 Behavior Transfer without common deviations
A principal justification of inverse optimal control techniques that attempt
to identify behavior in terms of utility functions is the ability to consider
what behavior might result if the underlying decision problem were changed
while the interpretation of features into utilities remain the same [Ng and
Russell, 2000, Ratliff et al., 2006]. This enables prediction of agent behavior
in a no-regret or agnostic sense in problems such as a robot encountering
novel terrain [Silver et al., 2010] as well as route recommendation for drivers
traveling to unseen destinations [Ziebart et al., 2008b].
Econometricians are interested in similar situations, but for much dif-
ferent reasons. Typically, they aim to validate a model of market behavior
from observations of product sales. In these models, the firms assume a fixed
pricing policy given known demand. The econometrician uses this fixed pol-
icy along with product features and sales data to estimate or bound both
the consumers’ utility functions as well as unknown production parameters,
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like markup and production cost [Berry et al., 1995, Nevo, 2001]. In this
line of work, the observed behavior is considered accurate to start with; it
is unclear how suitable these methods are for settings with limited or noisy
observations.
In our prior work, we introduced an approach to behavior transfer appli-
cable between games with different action sets [Waugh et al., 2011a]. It is
based off the assumption of transfer rationality, or for two games Γ and
Γ´ and some constant κ > 0,
∀w ∈ V, RegretΓ´Φ(σˆΓ|w) ≤ κRegretΓΦ(σΓ|w).
Roughly, we assume that under preferences with low regret in the original
game, the behavior in the unobserved game should also have low regret.
By enforcing this property, if the agents are performing well with respect
to their true preferences, then the transferred behavior will also be of high
quality.
Assuming transfer rationality is equivalent to using the conditional ICE
estimation program with differing game distributions for the predicted and
demonstrated regret features. In such a case, the program is not necessarily
feasible and the constraints must be relaxed. For example, a slack variable
may be added to the primal, or through regularization in the dual. We note
that this requires the estimation program to be run at test time.
6 Sample Complexity
In practice, we do not have full access to the agents’ true behavior—if we did,
prediction would be straightforward and we would not require our estimation
technique. Instead, we may only approximate the desired expectations by
averaging over a finite number of observations,
rξ˜f (σ˜|w) ≈
1
T
T∑
t=1
rΓ
t
f (a
t|w).
In real applications there are costs associated with gathering these obser-
vations and, thus, there are inherent limitations on the quality of this ap-
proximation. Next, we will analyze the sensitivity of our approach to these
types of errors.
First, although |A| is exponential in the number of players, our technique
only accesses σ˜ through expected regret features of the form rξ˜f (σ˜). That
is, we need only approximate these features accurately, not the distribution
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σ. For finite-dimensional vector spaces, we can bound how well the regrets
match in terms of |Φ| and the dimension of the space.
Theorem 9. With probability at least 1 − δ, for any w, by observing T ≥
1
22
log 2|Φ| dimVδ outcomes we have for all deviations r
ξ˜
f (σ˜|w) ≤ rξf (σ|w) +
∆‖w‖1.
where ∆ is the maximum possible regret over all basis directions. The
proof is an application of the union bound and Hoeffding’s inequality and is
provided in the Appendix.
Alternatively, we can bound how well the regrets match independently
of the space’s dimension by considering each utility function separately.
Theorem 10. With probability at least 1− δ, for any w, by observing T ≥
1
22
log |Φ|δ outcomes we have for all deviations r
ξ˜
f (σ˜|w) ≤ rξf (σ|w) + ∆(w).
where ∆(w) is the maximum possible regret under w. Again, the proof
is in the Appendix.
Both of the above bounds imply that, so long as the true utility function
is not too complex, with high probability we need only logarithmic many
samples in terms of |Φ| and dimV to closely approximate rξf (σ) and avoid
a large violation of our rationality condition.
Theorem 11. If for all f , rξ˜f (σ˜|w) ≤ rξf (σ|w) + γ, then Regretξ˜Φ(σ˜|w) ≤
RegretξΦ(σ|w) + γ.
Proof. For all deviations, f ∈ Φ, rξ˜f (σ˜|w) ≤ rξf (σ|w)+γ ≤ RegretξΦ(σ|w)+γ.
In particular, this holds for the deviation that maximizes the demonstrated
regret.
7 Experimental Results
7.1 Synthetic Routing Game
To evaluate our approach experimentally, we first consider a simple synthetic
routing game. Seven drivers in this game choose how to travel home during
rush hour after a long day at the office. The different road segments have
varying capacities that make some of them more or less susceptible to con-
gestion. Upon arrival home, the drivers record the total time and distance
they traveled, the fuel that they used, and the amount of time they spent
stopped at intersections or in congestion—their utility features.
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In this game, each of the drivers chooses from four possible routes, yield-
ing over 16, 000 possible outcomes. We obtained an ε-social welfare maxi-
mizing correlated equilibrium for those drivers using a subgradient method
where the drivers preferred mainly to minimize their travel time, but were
also slightly concerned with fuel cost. The demonstrated behavior σ˜Γ was
sampled from this true behavior distribution σΓ.
In Figure 1 we compare the prediction accuracy of MaxEnt ICE, mea-
sured using log loss, Ea∼σΓ
[− log2 σˆΓ(a)], against a number of baselines by
varying the number of observations sampled from the ε-equilibrium. The
baseline algorithms are: a smoothed multinomial distribution over the joint-
actions, a logistic regression classifier parameterized with the outcome util-
ities, and a maximum entropy inverse optimal control approach [Ziebart
et al., 2008a] trained individually for each player.
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Figure 1: Prediction error (log loss) as a function of number of observations
in the synthetic routing game.
In Figure 1, we see that MaxEnt ICE predicts behavior with higher
accuracy than all other algorithms when the number of observations is lim-
ited. In particular, it achieves close to its best performance with only 16
observations. The maximum likelihood estimator eventually overtakes it, as
expected since it will ultimately converge to σΓ, but only after 10, 000 obser-
vations, or close to as many observations as there are outcomes in the game.
MaxEnt ICE cannot learn the true behavior exactly in this case without
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Problem Logistic Regression MaxEnt Ice
Add Highway 4.177 3.093
Add Driver 4.060 3.477
Gas Shortage 3.498 3.137
Congestion 3.345 2.965
Table 1: Transfer error (log loss) on unobserved games.
additional constraints due to the social welfare criteria the true behavior
optimizes. That is, our rationality assumption does not hold in this case.
We note that the logistic regression classifier and the inverse optimal control
techniques perform better than the multinomial under low sample sizes, but
they fail to outperform MaxEnt ICE due to their inability to appreciate the
strategic nature of the game.
Next, we evaluate behavior transfer from this routing game to four sim-
ilar games, the results of which are displayed in Table 1. The first game,
Add Highway, adds a new route to the game. That is, we simulate the city
building a new highway. The second game, Add Driver, adds another driver
to the game. The third game, Gas Shortage, keeps the structure of the
game the same, but changes the reward function to make gas mileage more
important to the drivers. The final game, Congestion, simulates adding con-
struction to the major roadway, delaying the drivers. Here, we do not share
deviations across the training and test game and we add a slack variable in
the primal to ensure feasibility.
These transfer experiments even more directly demonstrate the benefits
of learning utility weights rather than directly learning the joint-action dis-
tribution; direct strategy-learning approaches are incapable of being applied
to general transfer setting. Thus, we can only compare against the Logistic
Regression. We see from Table 1 that MaxEnt ICE outperforms the Logistic
Regression in all of our tests. For reference, in these new games, the uniform
strategy has a loss of approximately 6.8 in all games, and the true behavior
has a loss of approximately 2.7.
These experiment demonstrates that learning underlying utility func-
tions to estimate observed behavior can be much more data-efficient for
small sample sizes. Additionally, it shows that the regret-based assump-
tions of MaxEnt ICE are beneficial in strategic settings, even though our
rationality assumption does not hold in this case.
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7.2 Market Entry Game
We next evaluate our approach against a number of baselines on data gath-
ered for the Market Entry Prediction Competition [Erev et al., 2010]. The
game has four players and is repeated for fifty trials and is meant to simu-
late a firm’s decision to enter into a market. On each round, all four players
simultaneous decide whether or not to open a business. All players who en-
ter the market receive a stochastic payoff centered at 10− kE, where k is a
fixed parameter unknown to the players and E is the number of players who
entered. Players who do not enter the market receive a stochastic payoff
with zero mean. After each round, each player is shown their reward, as
well as the reward they would have received by choosing the alternative.
Observations of human play were gathered by the CLER lab at Har-
vard [Erev et al., 2010]. Each student involved in the experiment played ten
games lasting fifty rounds each. The students were incentivized to play well
through a monetary reward proportional to their cumulative utility. The
parameter k was randomly selected in a fashion so that the Nash equilib-
rium had an entry rate of 50% in expectation. In total, 30, 000 observations
of play were recorded. The intent of the competition was to have teams sub-
mit programs that would play in a similar fashion to the human subjects.
That is, the data was used at test time to validate performance. In contrast,
our experiments use actual observations of play at training time to build a
predictive model of the human behavior. As we are interested in stationary
behavior, we train and test on only the last twenty five trials of each game.
We compared against two baselines. The first baseline, labeled Multi-
nomial in the figures, is a smoothed multinomial distribution trained to
minimize the leave-one-out cross validation loss. This baseline does not
make use of any features of the games. That is, if the players indeed play
according to the Nash equilibrium we would expect this baseline to learn
the uniform distribution. The second baseline, labeled Logistic Regression
in the figures, simply uses regularized logistic regression to learn a linear
classification boundary over the outcomes of the game using the same fea-
tures presented to our method. Operationally, this is equivalent to using
MaxEnt Inverse Optimal Control in a single-agent setting where the utility
is summed across all the players. This baseline has similar representational
power to our method, but lacks an understanding of the strategic elements
of the game.
In Figure 2, we see a comparison of our method against the baselines
when only the game’s true expected utility is used as the only feature. We
see that our method outperforms both baselines across all sample sizes. We
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Figure 2: Test log loss using only the game’s expected utility as a feature in
the market entry experiment.
also observe the multinomial distribution performs slightly better than the
uniform distribution, which attains a log loss of 4, though substantially worse
than logistic regression and our method, indicating that the human players
are not particularly well-modeled by the Nash equilibrium. Our method
substantially outperforms logistic regression, indicating that there is indeed
a strategic interaction that is not captured in the utility features alone.
In Figure 3, we see a comparison of our method against the baselines
using a variety of predictive features. In particular, we summarize a round
using the observed action frequencies, average reward, and reward variance
up to that point in the round. To weigh recent observations more strongly,
we also employ exponentially-weighted averages. We observe that the use
of these features substantially improves the predictive power of the feature-
based methods. Interestingly, we also note that the addition of these sum-
mary features also narrows the gap between logistic regression and MaxEnt
ICE. Under low sample sizes, the logistic model performs the best, but our
method overtakes it as more data is made available for training. It appears
that in this scenario, much of the strategic behavior demonstrated by the
participants can be captured by these history features.
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Figure 3: Test log loss using a number of history summary features in the
market entry experiment.
7.3 Mid-scale Hotel Market Entry
For our final experimental evaluation, we considered the task of predicting
the behavior of mid-scale hotel chains, like Holiday Inn and Ramada, in
the state of Texas. Given demographic and regulatory features of a county,
we wish to predict if each chain is likely to open a new hotel or to close
an existing one. The observations of play are derived from quarterly tax
records over a fifteen year period from forty counties, amounting to a total of
2, 205 observations. The particular counties selected had records of all of the
demographic and regulatory features, had at least four action observations,
and none was a chain’s flagship county. Figure 4 highlights the selected
counties and visualizes their regulatory practices.
The demographic and regulatory features were aggregated from various
sources and generously provided to us by Prof. Junichi Suzuki (2010). The
demographic features for each county include quantities such as size of its
population and its area, employment and household income statistics, as
well as the presence or absence of an interstate, airport or national park.
The regulatory features are indices measuring quantities such as commercial
land zoning restrictions, tax rates and building costs. In addition to these
noted features, which are fixed across all time periods, there are time-varying
features such as the number of hotels and rooms for each chain and the
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Figure 4: Regulatory index values for select counties in Texas. Blue means
little regulation and lower costs to enter the market. Red means higher
costs.
aggregate quarterly income.
We model each quarterly decision as a parameterized simultaneous-move
game with six players. Each player, a mid-scale hotel chain, has the action
set {Close,NoAction,Open}, resulting in 729 total outcomes. For the game’s
utility, we allocated the county’s features to each player in proportion to how
many hotels they owned. That is, if a player operated 3 out of 10 hotels,
the features associated with utility at that outcome would be the county’s
feature vector scaled by 0.3. We included bias features associated with each
action to account for fixed costs associated with opening or closing a hotel.
In the observation data, there are a small number of instances where a
chain opens or closes more than one hotel during a quarter. These events
are mapped to Open and Close respectively. Though the outcome-space is
quite large, the outcome distribution is extremely biased and the actions of
the chains are highly correlated. In particular, over 80% of time the time
no action is taken, around 17% of the time a single chain acts, and less
than 3% of the time more than one chain acts. As a result, one expects the
featureless multinomial estimator to have reasonable performance despite a
large number of classes.
For experimentation, we evaluated four algorithms: a smoothed multi-
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nomial distribution trained to minimize the leave one out cross-validation
loss, MaxEnt inverse optimal control trained once for all players, multi-class
logistic regression over the joint action space, and regret-matching ICE with
utility matching constraints. As the resulting optimizations for the latter
two algorithms are smooth, we employed the L-BFGS quasi-Newton method
with L2-regularization for training [Nocedal, 1980]. As a substitute for L1-
regularization, we selected the 23 best features based on their reduction in
training error when using logistic regression. Each county had 63 features
available. Of the top 23 features selected, 11 were regulatory indices.
For the logistic regression and ICE predictors, we only used utility fea-
tures on the 13 high probability outcomes (no firms build, and one firm
acting). The remaining outcomes had only bias features associated with
them to help prevent overfitting. We experimented with a number of types
of bias features, for example, 4 bias features (one for no firms build, one for
a single firm builds, one for a single firm closes and one for all remaining
outcomes), as well as 729 bias features (one for each outcome). We found
that, though on their own the different bias features had varied predictive
performance, when combined with utility and regret features they were quite
similar given the appropriate regularization. In the best performing model,
which we present here, we used 729 bias features resulting in 1, 028 param-
eters to the logistic regression model.
In the ICE predictor, we tied together the weights for each deviation
across all the players to reduce the number of model parameters. For exam-
ple, all players shared the same dual parameters for the NoAction→ Open
deviation. Effectively, this alters the rationality assumption such that the
average regret across all players is the quantity of interest, instead of the
maximum regret. Operationally, this is implemented as summing each de-
viation’s gradient in the dual. This treats the players anonymously, thus
we implicitly and incorrectly assume that conditioned on the county’s pa-
rameters each firm is identical. Due to the use parameter tying, the ICE
predictor has an additional 156 model parameters.
The test losses reported were computed using ten-fold cross validation.
To fit the regularization parameters for logistic regression, MaxEnt IOC
and MaxEnt ICE, we held out 10% of the training data and performed a
parameter sweep. For logistic regression, a separate parameter sweep and
regularization was used for the bias and utility features. For MaxEnt ICE, an
additional regularization parameter was selected for the regret parameters.
A sample of the predictions from MaxEnt ICE are shown in Figure 5.
In the left of Figure 6, we present the test errors of the three parameter-
ized methods in terms of their offset from that of the featureless multino-
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Figure 5: The marginalized probability that a chain will build a hotel in
Spring 1996 predicted by MaxEnt ICE. Brighter shades of green denote
higher probabilities.
mial. This quantity has lower variance than the absolute errors, allowing for
more accurate comparisons. We see that the addition of the regret features
more than doubles the improvement of logistic regression from 2.6% to 6.3%,
where as the inverse optimal control method only sees a 4.3% improvement.
In the center of Figure 6, we show the test log-loss when the methods are
only required to predict if any firm acts. Here, the models are still trained
over their complete outcome spaces and their predictions are marginalized.
We see that all three methods are equal within noise. That is, the differences
in the predictive performances come solely from each method’s ability to
predict who acts. We additionally performed this experiment without the
use of regulatory features and found that the logistic regression method
achieved a relative loss of −0.027300. Using a paired comparison between
the two methods, we note that this difference of 0.004443 is significant with
error 0.001886. This echoes Suzuki’s conclusions the regulatory environment
in this industry affect firms’ decisions to build new hotels [Suzuki, 2010],
measured here by improvements in predictive performance.
In the right of Figure 6, we demonstrate the test log loss conditioned
on at least one firm acting—the portion of the loss that differentiates the
methods. The logistic regression method with only utility features performs
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Figure 6: (Left) Test log loss on the full outcome space relative to the
smoothed multinomial, which has log loss 1.58234±0.058088. (Center) Test
log loss no build vs. build outcomes only. Loss is relative multinomial, with
log loss 0.721466 ± 0.016539. (Right) Test log loss conditioned on build
outcomes only. Loss is relative multinomial, with log loss 6.5911±0.116231.
the worst with a 1.8% improvement over the multinomial base line, the
individual inverse optimal control method improves by 4.1% and MaxEnt
ICE performs the best with a 6.3% improvement. That is, the addition
of regret features, and hence accounting for the strategic aspects of the
game, have a significant effect on the predictive performance in this setting.
We note that replacing the regulatory features in the regret portion of the
MaxEnt ICE model actually slightly improves performance to −0.471763,
though not by a significant margin. This implies that the regulatory features
have little or no bearing on predicting exactly the firm that will act, which
suggests the regulatory practices are unbiased.
8 Conclusion
In this article, we develop a novel approach to behavior prediction in strate-
gic multi-agent domains. We demonstrate that by leveraging a rationality
assumption and the principle of maximum entropy our method can be effi-
ciently implemented while achieving good statistical performance. Empir-
ically, we displayed the effectiveness of our approach on two market entry
data sets. We demonstrated both the robustness of our approach to er-
rors in our assumption as well as the importance of considering strategic
interactions.
Our future work will consider two new directions. First, we will address
classes of games where the action sets and players differ. A key benefit
of our current approach is that it enables these to differ between training
and testing which we only leverage modestly in the transfer experiments
for route prediction. This will involve investigating from a statistical point
of view novel notions of a deviation and their corresponding equilibrium
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concepts Second, we will consider different models of interactions, such as
stochastic games and extensive-form games. These models, though no more
expressive than matrix games, can often represent interactions exponentially
more succinctly. From a practical standpoint, this avenue of research will
allow for the application of our methods to a broader class of problems,
including, for instance, exploring the time series dependencies within the
Texas Hotel Chain data.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The lower bound holds as a consequence of Φint ⊆ Φswap.
Since max
x∈Ai,y∈Ai
rΓi;x→y(σ
Γ|w) ≥ rΓi;x→x(σΓ|w) = 0,
RegretΓ
Φswap(σ
Γ|w) = max
i∈N
∑
x∈Ai
max
y∈Ai
rΓi;x→y(σ
Γ|w)
≤ A ·max
i∈N
max
x∈Ai
max
y∈Ai
rΓi;x→y(σ
Γ|w)
= A · RegretΓ
Φint
(σΓ|w).
Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 immediately follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For any utility function w ∈ K, rΓf (σˆΓ|w) ≤ RegretΓΦf (σΓ|w) if
and only if there exists an ηf ∈ ∆Φf such that rΓf (σˆΓ) − Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ)
] ∈
−K∗.
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Proof. Assume that for all w ∈ K, rΓf (σˆΓ|w) ≤ RegretΓΦf (σΓ|w), ∃ηf ∈ ∆Φf
such that
rΓf (σˆ
Γ|w) ≤ Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ|w)]
Since 0 ∈ K,
max
w∈K
rΓf (σˆ
Γ|w)− Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ|w)] ≤ 0
= rΓf (σˆ
Γ|0)− Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ|0)]
= max
w∈K,t
rΓf (σˆ
Γ|w)− t, subject to: t ≥ rΓg (σΓ|w), ∀g ∈ Φf .
By Slater’s condition, strong duality holds and the resulting dual is the
feasibility problem
= min
ηf∈∆Φf
0, subject to: rΓf (σˆ
Γ)− Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ)
] ∈ −K∗.
Assume ∃ηf ∈ ∆Φf and y ∈ K∗ such that rΓf (σˆΓ)− Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ)
]
+ y = 0,
then for any w ∈ K
rΓf (σˆ
Γ|w)− Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ|w)]+ 〈y, w〉 = 〈0, w〉 = 0.
By the definition of the dual cone 〈y, w〉 ≥ 0, therefore
rΓf (σˆ
Γ|w) ≤ Eg∼ηf
[
rΓg (σ
Γ|w)] ≤ max
g∈Φf
rΓg (σ
Γ|w) = RegretΓΦf (σΓ|w).
Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 immediately follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 5. If joint strategy σΓ has ε external regret, and Γ is 2-player and
constant-sum with respect to w, then the marginal strategies form a 2ε-Nash
equilibrium under utility function w.
Proof. Denote one player x and the other y and their marginal strategies as
σ¯Γx and σ¯
Γ
y respectively. We are given
∀σΓx ∈ ∆Ax , uΓx(σΓx , σ¯Γy |w)− uΓx(σΓ|w) ≤ ε and,
∀σΓy ∈ ∆Ay , uΓy (σΓy , σ¯Γx |w)− uΓy (σΓ|w) ≤ ε
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as when either player deviates, the other resorts to playing his marginal
strategy. Substituting σ¯Γy for σ
Γ
y and summing, we get ∀σΓx ∈ ∆Ax
uΓx(σ
Γ
x , σ¯
Γ
y |w) + uΓy (σ¯Γy , σ¯Γx |w)−
[
uΓy (σ
Γ|w) + uΓx(σΓ|w)
] ≤ 2ε
uΓx(σ
Γ
x , σ¯
Γ
y |w) + uΓy (σ¯Γy , σ¯Γx |w)− C ≤ 2ε
uΓx(σ
Γ
x , σ¯
Γ
y |w) +
[
C − uΓx(σ¯Γy , σ¯Γx |w)
]− C ≤ 2ε
uΓx(σ
Γ
x , σ¯
Γ
y |w)− uΓx(σ¯Γy , σ¯Γx |w) ≤ 2ε
A symmetric argument shows the equivalent statement for the opposing
player.
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. The Legrange dual function,
L(θ, α, β, u, v, x) = max
σˆΓ,η,y
−
∑
a∈A
σˆΓ(a) log σˆΓ(a)+
∑
f∈Φ
αf
1−∑
g∈Φ
ηf (g)
+ β(1−∑
a∈A
σˆΓ(a)
)
+
∑
f∈Φ
〈rΓf (σˆΓ)−
∑
f,g∈Φ
ηf (g)r
Γ
g (σ
Γ) + yf , θf 〉+∑
f∈Φ
vf · ηf + u · σˆΓ + 〈yf , xf 〉,
is an upper bound on the primal objective for all u, v ≥ 0 and x ∈ K∗∗.
We solve the unconstrained maximization by setting the derivatives with
respect to σˆΓ, η, y to zero,
log σˆΓ(a) = u(a)− 1− β −
∑
f∈Φ
〈rΓf (a), θf 〉
〈rΓg (σΓ), θf 〉 − αf + vf (g) = 0 ∀f, g ∈ Φ
θf = −xf . ∀f ∈ Φ
Substituting this solution back into the Legrangian and minimizing this
upper bound gives
min
θ∈K∗∗,β
exp(−1− β)ZΓ(θ) +
∑
f∈Φ
αf + β subject to:
〈rΓg (σΓ), θf 〉 ≤ αf . ∀f, g ∈ Φ
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Solving for β explicitly we get β = logZΓ(θ)− 1, and moving the constraint
into the objective gives our result:
min
θ∈K∗∗
∑
f∈Φ
RegretΓΦ(σ
Γ|θf ) + logZΓ(θ).
Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. Let {e1, e2, . . . , eK} be an orthonormal basis for V , where K =
dimV . We first bound how well the regrets match in each basis direction.
P
[
max
f∈Φ,k∈[K]
|rξ˜f (σ˜|ek)− rξf (σ|ek)| ≥ ∆
]
≤ P
[ ⋃
f∈Φ,k∈[K]
(|rξ˜f (σ˜|ek)− rξf (σ|ek)| ≥ ∆)]
≤
∑
f∈Φ,k∈[K]
P
[
|rξ˜f (σ˜|ek)− rξf (σ|ek)| ≥ ∆
]
≤ 2|Φ|K exp (−2T2) ≤ δ.
T ≥ 1
22
log
2|Φ|dimV
δ
.
Next, we bound how well the regrets match under w, given all regrets are
close.
|rξ˜f (σ˜|w)− rξf (σ|w)| = |
K∑
k=1
αkr
ξ˜
f (σ˜|ek)− αkrξf (σ|ek)|
≤
K∑
k=1
|αk||rξ˜f (σ˜|ek)− rξf (σ|ek)|
≤ ∆
K∑
k=1
|αk|
≤ ∆‖w‖1.
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Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. Unlike Theorem 9, we will bound the error of regrets directly.
P
[
max
f∈Φ
rξ˜f (σ˜|w)− rξf (σ|w) ≥ ∆(w)
]
≤ P
[ ⋃
f∈Φ
(
rξ˜f (σ˜|w)− rξf (σ|w) ≥ ∆(w)
)]
≤
∑
f∈Φ
P
[
rξ˜f (σ˜|w)− rξf (σ|w) ≥ ∆(w)
]
≤ 2|Φ| exp (−2T2) ≤ δ
T ≥ 1
22
log
|Φ|
δ
.
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